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The Bank of Korea in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective
by Thomas F. Cargill
Introduction
This paper reviews and evaluates the development of Bank of Korea policy 
in historical and comparative perspective. The historical perspective focuses 
on the most recent of the three stages of Bank of Korea development: the 
period from its establishment in 1950 to the start of liberalization in the 
early 1980s; from the early 1980s to the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis of 1997–98; 
and from the ﬁ nancial crisis to the present. The comparative perspective 
considers the Bank of Korea in the context of the Bank of Japan and the 
U.S. Federal Reserve System. The Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve 
are meaningful bases for the Bank of Korea because of the historical and 
economic relationships among Korea, Japan, and the United States; the role 
Japan and the United States play in the world economy; and the inﬂ uence at 
various times of the Bank of Japan and Federal Reserve on the institutional 
design and development of the Bank of Korea.
Central bank policy is a necessary foundation for sustained noninﬂ ation-
ary economic growth, ﬁ nancial stability, and limited business ﬂ uctuations. 
Central bank policy errors in monetary control and lender-of-last-resort 
responsibilities have serious consequences for the real economy; and, 
although proper central bank policy is not sufﬁ cient to generate economic 
stability, it is a necessary condition for economic stability. The post–World 
War II experience of a large number of countries provides ample evidence 
of the adverse impact of central bank policy errors, especially those that 
generated high and unstable inﬂ ation rates and stagﬂ ation in the 1970s and 
1980s. In response to these failures and in the context of advances in the 
theoretical, historical, and institutional understanding of central bank policy, 
central bank policy outcomes improved after the 1970s when judged by the 
general decline in average inﬂ ation rates after 1990 (Table 1). Improved 
central bank policy outcomes have been accompanied by major institutional 
redesign of central banks during the past two decades.
Central banks are now more accountable, more formally independent from 
government, and more transparent than at any time in their history. In a 
Dr. Cargill is a Professor of Economics at the University of Nevada, 
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g ,
 1975–85 1985–95 1995–2000 2000–02
World index* 14.1 17.4 5.9 4.0 
Industrial economies* 8.0 3.4 1.9 2.1 
  United States 7.2 3.5 2.5 2.2 
  Euro area 7.3 3.4 1.7 2.5 
  Japan 4.7 1.4 0.3 -0.8 
  United Kingdom 10.6 4.5 2.5 2.2 
  Canada 8.1 3.3 1.7 2.4 
  Australia 5.0 5.2 1.9 3.7 
  New Zealand 13.4 5.7 1.4 2.7 
  Switzerland 3.3 2.8 0.7 0.8 
  Sweden 9.7 5.4 0.7 2.5 
Developing economies* 30.2 43.0 10.8 6.2 
  Africa* 15.8 21.8 9.4 7.5 
  Asia* 8.5 8.7 5.1 2.7 
    China 3.1 11.7 1.8 0.1 
    Korea 12.0 5.8 4.0 3.4 
  Europe* 24.8 89.2 37.4 22.5 
    Russia (1991–)  155.5 32.6 17.0 
    Czech Republic (1989–)  18.5 6.7 3.3 
    Poland (1989–)  83.9 12.7 3.7 
    Turkey 44.0 65.1 73.7 49.6 
  Middle East* 16.7 16.3 7.9 4.2 
    Saudi Arabia* 4.2 1.0 -0.3 -0.5 
  Western Hemisphere* 62.4 143.7 12.9 6.8 
    Brazil (1980–)* 146.2 704.3 7.5 6.9 
    Mexico 39.6 41.2 19.1 5.7 
* Data for 2002 were not available when table was constructed.
Table 1: Average Consumer Price Inﬂ ation Rates in 
Selected Countries, 1975–2002
Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development; China National Bureau of Statistics; Goskomstat of 
the Russian Federation. Table 1 was originally presented in Thomas F. Cargill and Elliott Parker, 
“Why Deﬂ ation Is Different,” Central Banking 14, no. 1 (August 2003): 35-42.
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frequently cited 1997 paper, Marvin Goodfriend concluded that monetary 
policy had come of age in the twentieth century.1 Goodfriend chronicled how 
central bank policy shifted away from short-run demand management and 
multiple goals to a single goal of long-run price stability. In Goodfriend’s 
view, by the 1990s the limits of central bank policy and what central bank 
policy could realistically contribute to economic stability and growth were 
better understood. Goodfriend’s perspective is deﬁ nitely correct in regard 
to price stability outcomes (see Table 1), but the experiences of the Bank 
of Japan and the Federal Reserve suggest the perspective might have been 
premature.
In Japan, the Bank of Japan played a major role in the run-up of real estate 
and equity prices in the second half of the 1980s. Easy monetary policy 
combined with a ﬂ awed ﬁ nancial liberalization process that encouraged im-
prudent lending were the direct causes of Japan’s asset bubble from 1985 to 
1989. The Bank of Japan then pursued tight policy until 1992 and then only 
gradually shifted to ease. As a result, Japan experienced a sharp disinﬂ ation 
from 1990 to 1994 and then deﬂ ation for the next decade.2 The enhanced 
formal independence of the Bank of Japan in 1997 had no meaningful impact 
on policy outcomes as the deﬂ ation continued until at least 2005.
In the United States, the Federal Reserve likewise contributed to the run-up 
in residential housing prices from 2001 to 2005 by driving interest rates to 
their lowest levels in the post–World War II period. Even though the Federal 
Reserve shifted to tighter policy in June 2004, much of the liquidity gener-
ated from 2001 to 2004 had worked its way through the ﬁ nancial system 
to support a housing bubble aided by lax regulatory oversight, government 
subsidization of housing for low- to moderate-income households, and a 
willingness to justify imprudent lending standards by the expectation that 
house prices would continue to increase indeﬁ nitely. As a result of the 
ﬁ nancial crisis of September 2008, the Federal Reserve has dramatically 
expanded its balance sheet and involved itself in supporting speciﬁ c sec-
tors of the economy. Some have concluded that this amounts to a de facto 
industrial policy.3 There is widespread concern that the large expansion of 
liquidity in the ﬁ nancial system represented by unprecedented levels of 
excess reserves held by depository institutions will provide the foundation 
for inﬂ ation. At a minimum, the Federal Reserve’s commitment to price 
stability will be tested during the next few years.
The record of the Bank of Korea since 1997 is more positive. The 1997–98 
Korean crisis made a fundamental impact on Korea’s attitudes and willing-
ness to redesign its economic institutions to be more competitive, open, and 
transparent. The December 1997 and August 2003 revisions of the Bank 
of Korea Act signiﬁ cantly changed the institutional design of the Bank of 
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Korea. The Bank of Korea is more transparent and independent than at any 
time since its establishment in 1950.
Bank of Korea policy contributed to rapid recovery from the 1997–98 crisis 
(Table 2) and stabilized inﬂ ationary expectations by a successful focus on 
price stability in the context of an inﬂ ation-target framework. Although many 
observers conclude the Bank of Korea has been successful in pursuing price 
stability,4 at the same time, Bank of Korea policy is not without criticism. 
Easy monetary policy from mid-2001 to mid-2005 contributed to the run-up 
of consumer debt and housing prices although there is some debate as to 
how important monetary policy was to Korea’s real estate bubble.5 In any 
event, Korea recovered, and the Bank of Korea’s “leaning” against the real 
estate bubble reduced the potential for a collapse of real estate prices as oc-
curred in Japan and the United States.6 Korea has not experienced a bursting 
of the real estate bubble to the degree of either Japan or the United States. 
Korea’s ﬁ nancial system withstood the shock, and, despite a turbulent few 
months of economic and ﬁ nancial distress after the U.S. ﬁ nancial crisis of 
2008, Korea appears to be recovering as 2009 comes to a close. The Bank 
of Korea in late October 2009 announced that GDP increased 2.9 percent 
in the third quarter following a 2.6 percent increase in the second quarter. 
The third-quarter increase in GDP was the strongest since the ﬁ rst quarter 
of 2002. The Bank of Korea also announced that the composite consumer 
sentiment index for October 2009 stood at 117, an increase from 114 in 
September.
In sum, Bank of Korea policy through 2008 can be judged successful in terms 
of price stability, and it has provided a clear message to market participants 
that price stability will be maintained in the future. This is a major policy 
success. Bank of Korea policy did contribute to a run-up of consumer credit 
and housing prices; however, general government policy and supply condi-
tions were also important. In any event, despite the drop in house prices 
and the shift toward tighter policy in 2005, the Korean economy did not 
experience the degree of economic and ﬁ nancial distress of either Japan or 
the United States when real estate prices in those countries collapsed. In 
sum, the recent economic decline cannot be attributed to errors made by 
the Bank of Korea during the past decade.
Korea’s current problems are not internal but are due to external shocks 
to the export sector and disruptions in the international ﬁ nancial system. 
Korea’s economy has been hit hard by the ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008. Unem-
ployment increased (it was 3.8 percent in July 2009) and real GDP declined 
5.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008; it increased by only 0.1 percent 
in the ﬁ rst quarter of 2009. As stated above, however, the second and third 
quarters of 2009 saw signiﬁ cant GDP growth, and industrial production has 
22151_049-065.indd   52 3/10/2010   4:03:03 PM
53The Bank of Korea in Historical and Comparative Perspective
C
ou
n
tr
y 
E
co
n
om
ic
 in
d
ic
at
or
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
Ja
pa
n 
R
ea
l 
G
D
P
, a
nn
ua
l 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 c
ha
ng
e 
2.
86
0.
18
0.
26
1.
41
2.
74
1.
93
2.
04
2.
39
-0
.6
4
In
fl
at
io
n,
 a
ve
ra
ge
 c
on
su
m
er
 p
ri
ce
s 
-0
.7
8
-0
.6
9
-0
.8
9
-0
.3
0
0.
00
-0
.3
0
0.
30
0.
00
1.
40
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
 
4.
72
5.
03
5.
36
5.
25
4.
72
4.
43
4.
13
3.
85
3.
99
G
en
er
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ba
la
nc
e 
as
 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f 
G
D
P
 
-7
.6
4
-6
.3
0
-8
.0
3
-8
.0
1
-6
.1
5
-5
.0
4
-4
.0
0
-2
.5
2
-5
.5
5
C
ur
re
nt
 a
cc
ou
nt
 b
al
an
ce
, b
il
li
on
s 
of
 $
 
$1
19
.6
$8
7.
8
$1
12
.6
$1
36
.2
$1
72
.1
$1
65
.7
$1
70
.4
$2
11
.0
$1
57
.1
K
or
ea
 
R
ea
l 
G
D
P
, a
nn
ua
l 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 c
ha
ng
e 
8.
49
3.
97
7.
15
2.
80
4.
62
3.
96
5.
18
5.
11
2.
22
In
fl
at
io
n,
 a
ve
ra
ge
 c
on
su
m
er
 p
ri
ce
s 
2.
26
4.
07
2.
76
3.
52
3.
59
2.
75
2.
24
2.
54
4.
67
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
 
4.
43
4.
02
3.
28
3.
57
3.
68
3.
73
3.
47
3.
25
3.
20
G
en
er
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ba
la
nc
e 
as
 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f 
G
D
P
 
1.
08
0.
55
2.
22
2.
53
2.
08
1.
79
1.
72
3.
47
1.
12
C
ur
re
nt
 a
cc
ou
nt
 b
al
an
ce
/b
il
li
on
s 
of
 $
 
$1
2.
3
$8
.0
$5
.4
$1
2.
0
$2
8.
2
$1
5.
0
$5
.4
$5
.9
-$
6.
4
U
ni
te
d
S
ta
te
s 
R
ea
l 
G
D
P
, a
nn
ua
l 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 c
ha
ng
e 
3.
66
0.
75
1.
60
2.
51
3.
64
2.
94
2.
78
2.
03
1.
11
In
fl
at
io
n,
 a
ve
ra
ge
 c
on
su
m
er
 p
ri
ce
s 
3.
37
2.
82
1.
60
2.
30
2.
67
3.
38
3.
22
2.
86
3.
80
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
 
3.
97
4.
74
5.
78
5.
99
5.
54
5.
08
4.
62
4.
63
5.
81
G
en
er
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ba
la
nc
e 
as
 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f 
G
D
P
 
1.
62
-0
.3
9
-3
.7
9
-4
.8
3
-4
.3
5
-3
.2
6
-2
.2
4
-2
.8
9
-6
.0
7
C
ur
re
nt
 a
cc
ou
nt
 b
al
an
ce
/b
il
li
on
s 
of
 $
 
-$
41
7.
4
-$
38
4.
7
-$
46
1.
3
-$
52
3.
4
-$
62
5.
0
-$
72
9.
0
-$
78
8.
1
-$
73
1.
2
-$
67
3.
3
Ta
bl
e 
2:
 M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 
Ja
pa
n,
 K
or
ea
, a
nd
 t
he
 U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
, 2
00
0–
20
08
So
ur
ce
:  
W
or
ld
 E
co
no
m
ic
 O
ut
lo
ok
 D
at
ab
as
e,
 I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l M
on
et
ar
y 
Fu
nd
, A
pr
il 
20
09
.
22151_049-065.indd   53 3/10/2010   4:03:03 PM
54 On Korea: Volume 3
rebounded to its precrisis level. While these developments are encouraging, 
Korea’s continued overreliance on exports, continuing U.S. economic and 
ﬁ nancial distress, and growing protectionism pose serious challenges for 
Korea’s economy.
The post-1997–98 crisis performance of the Bank of Korea along with the 
institutional redesign in 1997 and 2003 suggest the Bank of Korea has come 
of age and is better positioned than at any time since its establishment in 
1950 to contribute to a stable ﬁ nancial and monetary environment. This 
does not mean the Bank of Korea has not made mistakes during the past 
decade, but, compared with the precrisis period and the experiences of the 
Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve, Bank of Korea policy outcomes 
have been positive. The remainder of the paper outlines the major features 
of the coming of age of the Bank of Korea.
A historical overview of the three phases of Bank of Korea development is 
provided in the next section. Then the key factors generating institutional 
redesign of the Bank of Korea and how developments in macroeconomic 
theory and the study of central banking practices guided institutional rede-
sign of the Bank of Korea are described. Following that is a consideration 
of the 1997 and 2003 redesign of the Bank of Korea in comparison with 
the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve and in the broader context of the 
meaning of central bank independence. Then the transparency of the Bank 
of Korea is compared with the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve. A 
concluding section ends the paper.
Phases of Bank of Korea Development
There are three distinct phases of Bank of Korea development. The ﬁ rst phase 
covers the period of Korea’s nondemocratic government from 1950 to the 
mid-1980s, during which Bank of Korea policy was constrained by authori-
tarian governments that used central bank policy as part of a government-
directed industrial policy. Policy conﬂ icts on occasion resulted in dismissal 
of Bank of Korea governors.7 Price stability and prudential responsibilities 
took second place to government industrial objectives. The Bank of Korea 
under the administration of the government contributed to wide swings in the 
rate of inﬂ ation, supported ﬁ nancially weak corporations by making policy 
loans to speciﬁ c sectors of the economy, and operated its discount window 
with the objective of preventing failures of ﬁ nancial institutions (mainly 
banks) and markets. The effects of unstable prices, support of ﬁ nancially 
weak corporations, and the moral hazard implicit in Korea’s industrial 
policy were masked by the rapid industrialization of the Korean economy 
through the 1970s. By the 1980s, however, economic and ﬁ nancial distress 
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had accumulated to a point whereby the Korean government initiated its 
ﬁ rst liberalization efforts designed to stabilize the macro economy.
The second phase started in the late 1980s as government industrial policy 
began to unravel, and it ended with the economic and ﬁ nancial distress 
of 1997–98. During this period, Korea also completed a transition from 
military rule to democratic government. The Bank of Korea continued to 
be constrained by government policy objectives because of inertia from the 
past, continued to operate under administrative dominance by the Ministry 
of Finance and Economy, and suffered under the willingness of a grow-
ing class of elected politicians to use central bank policy to support client 
industries and sectors. As in the ﬁ rst phase, many of these problems were 
masked by rapid growth driven by exports as the world expanded in the 
1980s and early 1990s.
The third phase commenced with the crisis of 1997–98 and the major in-
stitutional redesign of the Bank of Korea in 1997 and 2003. Revision of the 
Bank of Korea Act in December 1997 and August 2003 resulted in a major 
redesign of the Bank of Korea. The Bank of Korea became more focused on 
price stability, more independent of government, and more transparent. These 
institutional changes contributed to improved policy outcomes, especially in 
terms of price stability.
Figure 1 indicates the inﬂ ation rate of Korea’s consumer price index during 
the period from 1966 to 2008. Table 3 presents the average, standard error, 
Figure 1: Inﬂ ation Rate of Korea’s Consumer Price Index, 1966–2008
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Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System (ECOS), various years.
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and coefﬁ cient of variance of the inﬂ ation rate over three periods: 1966–85, 
1986–98, and 1999–2008. The rate of inﬂ ation declined signiﬁ cantly from the 
ﬁ rst to the second phase of Bank of Korea development. While the average 
inﬂ ation rate of 5.8 remained high, the variation of the inﬂ ation rate relative 
to the average declined signiﬁ cantly. The third period witnessed a continued 
decline in the inﬂ ation rate although the coefﬁ cient of variation remained es-
sentially unchanged from the second period.
Period Average 
Standard
deviation 
Coefficient of 
variance
1966–85 13.14 7.64 0.58 
1986–98 5.78 1.99 0.34 
1999–2008 2.92 1.09 0.37 
Table 3: Inﬂ ation in Korea’s Consumer Price Index, 1966–2008
average, standard error, and coefﬁ cient of variance
Source: Based on data from Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System (ECOS), various years.
The Bank of Korea and Current Views of Central Bank 
Policy
The two major institutional redesigns of the Bank of Korea in December 
1997 and August 2003 and the improved inﬂ ation policy outcomes since 
the crisis of 1997–98 can be traced to four sets of factors.
First, the Bank of Korea had failed in the precrisis period to achieve a low 
and steady inﬂ ation rate. Price stability is widely considered to be the pri-
mary objective of central banking and, in the case of the Bank of Korea, was 
explicitly required in the Bank of Korea Act that made the Bank of Korea 
responsible for both price and ﬁ nancial stability. High inﬂ ation and unstable 
inﬂ ation make it difﬁ cult for market participants to establish economic 
contracts in nominal amounts; and, in the context of interest rate ceilings, 
inﬂ ation generates gaps between regulated and unregulated interest rates 
that disrupt the ﬁ nancial and real sectors of the economy. The evidence is 
overwhelming: unstable inﬂ ation rates and unstable inﬂ ationary expectations 
impose real costs on the macro economy.
Second, political pressure from the United States, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to 
liberalize Korea’s ﬁ nancial markets and institutions in the late 1980s and 
into the 1990s included the redesign the Bank of Korea. Speciﬁ cally, Korea 
was being urged to enhance the formal independence of the Bank of Korea 
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to render it a less active agent for Korea’s industrial policies. Korea did 
not respond in substance with regard to ﬁ nancial liberalization in general, 
and in regard to the Bank of Korea made no effort to redesign the Bank. In 
fact, the only effort to redesign the central bank took place in 1997, and it 
failed because of labor union issues over the plan to shift bank supervision 
to the Ministry of Finance and Economy. The suddenness and severity of 
the 1997–98 crisis changed the environment, however, and Korea embarked 
on a major redesign of its ﬁ nancial and regulatory institutions, including 
the Bank of Korea.
Third, the Bank of Korea’s redesign and improved policy outcomes reﬂ ected 
the general development of central bank policy in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Developments in macroeconomic theory, recognition of the public choice 
problems of central bank policy, and recognition of the importance of price 
stability guided Bank of Korea reform. Stagﬂ ation in the 1970s and new 
macroeconomic models focused on market clearing, and expectation forma-
tion shifted emphasis from short-run Keynesian-type demand management 
to long-run price stability. Central banks could make their most important 
contribution to macroeconomic performance by managing inﬂ ationary ex-
pectations through a reputable commitment to price stability. Widespread 
acceptance of lags in the effect of monetary policy and public choice 
perspectives on central bank policy shifted emphasis even more toward 
long-run price stability. Formal independence from government and greater 
transparency became widely accepted as a more optimal institutional design 
to ensure long-run price stability. Recognizing that formal independence 
may be insufﬁ cient to generate long-run price stability, inﬂ ation targeting 
has become increasingly embraced by central banks.
Independence of the Bank of Korea
The institutional relationship between central banks and government has 
been a subject of considerable interest ever since David Ricardo showed in 
the early nineteenth century how the close relationship between the Bank 
of England and government led to inﬂ ation and depreciation of the pound. 
Central bank independence was gradually accepted over time as a necessary 
condition for a stable monetary and ﬁ nancial environment, although inde-
pendence from government was maintained more by adherence to the gold 
standard and eligibility rules for discounting than by formal independence.
The institutional design of the central bank became a more important policy 
issue since the collapse of the gold standard and, especially, during the past 
three decades, which have seen the enhanced role of price stability and 
establishment of stable price expectations in macroeconomic models. As 
22151_049-065.indd   57 3/10/2010   4:03:04 PM
58 On Korea: Volume 3
a result, establishing or extending central bank independence has occurred 
in a large number of countries: New Zealand (1989); Colombia, Italy, 
and Portugal (1992); Korea, Japan, and the United Kingdom (1997); and 
Sweden (1998). The 1992 Maastricht Treaty adopted formal independence 
as the foundation for the eventual establishment of the European Central 
Bank. The IMF adopted independence as a policy goal and used the 1997 
Asian ﬁ nancial crisis, especially in Korea, to encourage greater central 
bank independence.
The shift toward more formal central banks appears to be justiﬁ ed by policy 
outcomes. A large body of literature based on correlations between measures 
of central bank independence and inﬂ ation over time and across countries 
shows that more formally independent central banks generate lower inﬂ a-
tion outcomes.
The details of the December 1997 revision of the Bank of Korea Act as it 
relates to formal independence have been discussed previously.8 The 2003 
Bank of Korea Act revisions have been summarized.9 The 2003 revisions 
clariﬁ ed and enhanced the independence of the Bank of Korea but still 
left some ambiguities about who is responsible for ﬁ nancial stability. This 
section reviews the independence of the Bank of Korea from a historical 
and comparative perspective and evaluates the contribution of central bank 
independence to proper central bank policy outcomes.
An index of independence for the Bank of Korea shows that, although 
the Bank of Korea became more independent (0.27 to 0.32 on a scale of 
0 to 1.0), the change was not dramatic when compared with the enhanced 
independence of the Bank of Japan (0.17 to 0.38).10 The declaration that 
the Bank of Korea should conduct monetary policy independent of the 
government represented a historically signiﬁ cant change; however, the fact 
that the inﬂ ation target was to be decided in consultation with the govern-
ment, the presence of outside inﬂ uence on the membership of the newly 
established Monetary Policy Committee, and the fact that the revised Bank 
of Korea Act was ambiguous about what, if any, role was assigned to the 
Bank of Korea for ﬁ nancial stability mitigated against the potential increase 
in independence.
The 2003 revision rectiﬁ es these shortcomings to a signiﬁ cant degree. The 
formal independence of the Bank of Korea is enhanced, and the Bank of 
Korea is given increased responsibility for the operation of the payment 
and settlement system, an important aspect of ﬁ nancial stability. Ambiguity 
continues, however, because the primary responsibility of the Bank of Korea 
is price stability without an explicit responsibility for ﬁ nancial stability.
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It is not clear which government agency in Korea is responsible for ﬁ nan-
cial stability. The responsibility appears to be shared among the Bank of 
Korea, Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Financial Services Commission, 
Financial Supervisory Service, and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion. In practice, the Financial Services Commission and Financial Super-
visory Service have authority over the entire ﬁ nancial system and have de 
facto primary responsibility for ﬁ nancial stability. Adjusting the index11 of 
independence cited above to incorporate the 2003 revision of the Bank of 
Korea Act increases the index from 0.32 to 0.36.
The Bank of Korea is more formally independent than previously, and its 
independence is now on a par with the Bank of Japan; however, the Bank 
of Korea remains one of the least formally independent central banks.12 
With the use of a different index framework than cited above, the Bank of 
Korea’s independence can be compared with 25 other central banks over 
the period from 1988 to 2000. The central banks of Korea and Australia 
during the period 1988–2000 had the lowest ranking—73 out of 100—with 
the highest ranking of 96 achieved by Germany. The United States had a 
ranking of 92.13 The 2003 revisions of the Bank of Korea Act would likely 
increase Korea’s ranking, but Korea would continue to remain in the lowest 
quartile of central bank independence.
Despite this ranking, the current level of Bank of Korea independence is 
more than sufﬁ cient to generate price stability over time. In fact, formal 
independence is neither a necessary nor a sufﬁ cient condition for generating 
price stability. Other factors are important. The Federal Reserve has gener-
ated two major departures from price stability—deﬂ ation in the 1930s and 
inﬂ ation in the 1970s—despite being one of the most independent central 
banks in the world. The Bank of Japan achieved reasonable inﬂ ation policy 
outcomes while being one of the world’s most dependent central banks, but 
it permitted deﬂ ation after achieving enhanced independence in 1998.
In addition, the widely published correlations between measures of central 
bank independence and inﬂ ation outcomes are seriously ﬂ awed.14 Thus, 
although the Bank of Korea remains less independent than other central 
banks, it has become sufﬁ ciently independent to conduct monetary policy, 
especially when considered in the context of enhanced transparency.
Bank of Korea Transparency
In the past two decades the institutional redesign of central banks has fo-
cused on three areas: elevation of the role of long-run price stability as the 
primary objective of central bank policy; enhanced formal independence 
from government; and enhanced transparency and communication with 
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the public about the formulation, execution, and policy objectives of the 
central bank. Central banks have clearly focused more on price stability, as 
illustrated by inﬂ ation policy outcomes across many countries (see Table 1). 
Central banks have been redesigned to provide greater formal independence 
from government. Likewise, the Bank of Korea has become more focused 
on price stability and is more formally independent from the government 
than it was previously.
Transparency and communication with the public have also become major 
objectives of central bank redesign. In fact, the literature on transparency has 
increased from only a few contributions before 1980 to a great number of 
publications, most of which have been published in the past two decades.15 
In the past, central banks provided so little meaningful information about 
their goals and operating frameworks that it was said that central bankers 
conducted operations as if they were “secrets of the temple.”16 This section 
deﬁ nes transparency, indicates why transparency is important, reviews 
trends in central bank transparency, reviews the role of inﬂ ation targeting 
in transparency, and provides a historical and comparative perspective of 
Bank of Korea transparency.
Transparency deﬁ ned. Central bank transparency or communication with 
the public is deﬁ ned as providing meaningful information on six topics: (1) 
objectives of monetary policy, (2) rationalization of speciﬁ c policy decisions, 
(3) economic outlook, (4) projections of future economic performance, (5) 
projections of likely monetary policy, and (6) economic and ﬁ nancial data. 
Central banks implement this transparency through the release of public 
statements and communication with the government made available on the 
Internet in English. Advances in computer and Internet technology provide 
an important foundation for communication with the public.
Basis for transparency. The advances in computer technology such as 
the Internet were not the catalyst for enhanced transparency although they 
provided a platform for greater transparency. The foundation is more fun-
damental. There are economic and political foundations.
In terms of economic modeling, transparency can be understood in the 
context of a Taylor rule in which the central bank sets the current interbank 
rate according to three conditions: (1) the long-run policy rate or neutral 
rate consistent with price stability, (2) the output gap between actual GDP 
and potential GDP, and (3) the inﬂ ation gap between actual inﬂ ation and 
the inﬂ ation objective. In this framework, the current interbank rate will be 
higher than the long-run policy rate if the output gap or the inﬂ ation gap, 
or both, are positive. The current interbank rate will be lower than the long-
run policy rate if the output gap, the inﬂ ation gap, or both, are negative. 
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Although the Taylor rule is simple, central bank policy, including the Bank 
of Korea’s, in many countries tends to follow it.
The current interbank rate has little impact on spending. What is far more 
important is the public’s expected series of interbank rates because inter-
est rates on longer-term assets are equal to the current short-term rate plus 
expected short-term rates over the maturity of the asset. Hence, the greater 
the degree of transparency, the better the ability of the public to develop 
the expected path of short-term interest rates. The more the central bank 
communicates with the public about this framework, the greater the public’s 
expectation of future interest rate stability. To illustrate: if the output gap or 
inﬂ ation gap is positive (or negative), increases (or decreases) in the cur-
rent interbank rate are understood to be temporary. Thus, the central bank 
has greater inﬂ uence over a range of interest rates. Transparency also helps 
the central bank commit to price stability because the more transparent the 
central bank is, the more it reveals its commitment to price stability.
The political dimension is also important. Central banks are powerful insti-
tutions run largely by individuals not directly subject to the voting process. 
Central banks have been increasingly independent of government, and the 
shift away from exchange rate targets provides them with considerable 
discretion. In the context of recent events, the increased role of central 
banks in supporting weak ﬁ nancial institutions and markets emphasizes the 
importance of transparency. Transparency is an important foundation for 
democratic accountability.
Trends in transparency. Efforts have been made to measure central bank 
transparency; one comprehensive effort was carried out by Nergiz Dincer 
and Barry Eichengreen.17 Their transparency index has multiple dimen-
sions: political transparency with respect to policy objections, economic 
transparency with respect to economic data, review of current economic 
conditions and projections of economic conditions, procedural transpar-
ency with respect to the decision-making process, policy transparency with 
respect to disclosure and rationalization of policy decisions, and operational 
transparency with respect to implementation of the central bank’s policy 
actions. Dincer and Eichengreen collected information for 100 central banks 
for every year from 1998 to 2006 and found a general increase in transpar-
ency, and preliminary econometric evidence suggests transparency has a 
favorable impact on price stability.
Inﬂ ation targeting (IT). It is well known that central banks, in the absence 
of an inﬂ ation target, are subject to time inconsistency; that is, they have a 
tendency to conduct policy that pursues short-run objectives that are sub-
optimal in the long run. IT is offered as a solution to the time-inconsistency 
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problem, and many central banks have adopted the framework. Since New 
Zealand’s pioneering adoption of IT in 1990, more than 20 industrial coun-
tries have successfully adopted IT. IT contributes signiﬁ cantly to transpar-
ency and anchors the public’s expectations of future inﬂ ation. One survey 
of a large number of studies concluded that inﬂ ationary expectations are 
more anchored and inﬂ ation forecast errors are smaller in IT countries than 
in countries without IT.18
Transparency and the Bank of Korea. In 1998 the transparency index (which 
runs from 0 to 15.0) was 6.5, 8.0, and 8.5 for Korea, Japan, and the United 
States, respectively.19 In 2006, the index was 8.5, 9.5 and 10.0 for Korea, 
Japan, and the United States, respectively. The Bank of Korea had the 
lowest index in 1998, but the greatest percentage increase in transparency 
compared with the other two central banks. The most transparent central 
banks in 2006 were New Zealand (14.0) and Sweden (14.5).
The most signiﬁ cant aspect of Bank of Korea transparency is IT combined 
with the primary objective of price stability in the Bank of Korea Act. The 
Bank of Korea is one of the more explicit central banks concerning this 
aspect of transparency. The U.S. Federal Reserve continues to operate 
under a confusing and contradictory set of objectives. According to the 
Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Reserve shall maintain long-run growth 
of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s 
long-run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the 
goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term 
interest rates. None of these goals is deﬁ ned, nor is there recognition that 
price stability and maximum employment may conﬂ ict. Nonetheless, the 
Federal Reserve has increasingly emphasized price stability, which, based 
on a reading of Federal Reserve documents, is deﬁ ned in the range of 0–3 
percent. The Bank of Japan Law is much clearer: the Bank of Japan is 
required to pursue price stability and ﬁ nancial stability. Like the Federal 
Reserve, however, the Bank of Japan does not operate with IT, but a read-
ing of Bank of Japan documents suggests the Bank deﬁ nes prices stability 
within the 0–2 percent range.
The Bank of Korea currently targets the CPI inﬂ ation rate at 3 percent, 
plus or minus 1.0 percent. This range is determined in consultation with 
the government. Since IT was established in 1998, the target inﬂ ation rate 
has ranged from 9.0 percent for a short period in 1998 and then to 2.5–3.5 
percent thereafter. The importance of IT and the goal of price stability are 
made clear on the home page of the Bank of Korea’s Web site, http://eng.
bok.or.kr/, which prominently states “The Bank of Korea Pursues Price 
Stability.” The statement is followed by the inﬂ ation target and the target 
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base rate. In this regard, the Bank of Korea stands out from both the Bank 
of Japan and the Federal Reserve.
Concluding Comment
Korea recovered from the 1997–98 crisis rapidly and exhibited noninﬂ ation-
ary economic growth for the next decade. The Bank of Korea contributed 
importantly to this development by achieving price stability, providing 
transparency about its operations and goals, and by conducting policy 
more independently of the government. The future of the Korean economy 
is uncertain despite recent improvements in the economy. Economic and 
ﬁ nancial distress continues in the United States, and fundamental changes 
in consumer spending in the United States will adversely impact export-
oriented economies like Korea’s. As a result, the Bank of Korea faces 
many challenges. Aside from any longer-run problems facing the Korean 
economy and if the Korean economy is indeed on the path to sustained 
recovery, the Bank of Korea will be required to adopt an exit strategy from 
easy policy without slowing the economy; at the same time it must maintain 
price stability. There is every indication the Bank of Korea will be able to 
accomplish these tasks.
The Bank of Korea will continue to evolve toward being a more independent 
and transparent central bank. Although there is room for improvement, the 
transparency of the Bank of Korea is remarkable, especially compared with 
the level of precrisis transparency. Although the Bank remains subject to 
government pressure, it has been showing more independence. The Bank of 
Korea has pursued policy in some cases against the wishes of the Ministry 
of Finance and Economy.20 All considered, the Bank of Korea has come of 
age in the ﬁ rst decade of the new century.
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